

T H E

Seasonable Writer.

To which is added, the

S H O R T V I E W

O F T H E

State of A F F A I R S.

With Relation to *Great Britain*, for Four Years
past. With some Remarks on the Treaty late-
ly publish'd, and a Pamphlet entitled, *Obser-
vations upon it.*

L O N D O N :

Printed for A. MOORE, near St. Paul's. 1729. (Price Six-pence.)

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SHORT VIEW

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The SEASONABLE WRITER: Being an *Appendix* to the *Observations* upon the late Treaty, &c.

IT May seem a Piece of Presumption in *Me*, to say any thing on the Subject of this glorious Treaty, after the mild, judicious, and candid Defence of it, mentioned in the Title of this Paper; in which the Author, without Prejudice, Passion, or any personal Reflection, has set the whole Negotiation in so clear a Light, that one should almost be tempted to think it came from the same able Hand, which had the principal Share in procuring us this Blessing.

Yet cannot I forbear, like pickl'd Herring after the Vaulter on the High Rope, to shew my Willingness to entertain the Lower Rank of my Countrymen with this Scene of publick Felicity, by making a short Inventory of the many Advantages of the Peace, and the great Merits of the Peace-Makers.

First, I cannot but congratulate them upon the sole Triumph of the last War; I mean not any foreign Laurels, but their having routed CALEB and his Allies; that formidable Confederacy! which (according to our Author) have so long stop't the Peace with Spain; and tho', with respect to their Numbers, a poor and pitiful Faction, having scarce more than one Man of Parts among them, at least of Parts in any wise equal to the meanest of our present Ministers (and when I consider their Abilities, I should be at a loss to say which is he) I say, this Faction are now endeavouring to obstruct his Imperial Majesty's Accession, and attempting to raise a War in the Empire; and are doing what in them lies to undo all a second Time, by inciting a certain Monarch to a new Renunciation of his Crown and Dignity. There is one good Thing indeed, which Caleb and his Associates have by Chance brought about, They prevented the provisional Treaty and a Truce, and have thereby been remotely instrumental in procuring us a perpetual Peace; but their malicious Intention excludes them from all pretence to Merit on this Account.

I proceed now to take Notice of some of the most conspicuous Advantages of the present Treaty.

And the first I shall take the Liberty of presenting to your View, is the peaceable Manner of obtaining this Peace; not by Blows and Blood, or dear bought Victories, but by good Words and Civility, Patience and Long-suffering.

Secondly, The Security to the Protestant Succession, by the Assistance of 24,000 Foot and Horse, French and Spaniards, in Case of an Invasion. There wants but one Accession more, to make our Auxiliaries 36,000 Men.

Thirdly, The Additional Security of Gibraltar, by the Guarantee of his Catholick Majesty; what

a Comfort will it be to the Garrison of that important Place, when the King of Spain appears before it with an Army, to be assured that he comes for its Defence and Protection! And here I cannot but take Notice of the great Art and consummate Prudence of the Ministry, in making and contriving a new Security for the Possession of Gibraltar from those very Treaties, which were no Security to it before; and especially preventing Spain from renouncing it a second Time, which would certainly have endangered it, because two Negatives make an Affirmative.

Fourthly, By reducing the formidable Power of the House of Austria, by preventing Italy from falling into his Hands; and by forcing his Imperial Majesty to repair the Affront offered to Don Carlos, in refusing him his Daughter for a Bride.

Fifthly, The Articles for Reparation of the Damages of our Merchants, which are so full, that I humbly propose erecting a Company with a Joint Stock, which Corporation may borrow its Title from the ingenious, tho' old-fashion'd Game, called Losing Lotum, when that Person wins who loses most.

This Stock of the Lotum Company considering Accidents, I reckon would be about six per Cent. out of Pocket, computed thus. For Contingency of Commissioners not agreeing, a Case unprovided for, 2 per Cent. For Deduction of unlawful Commerce, one and a half. For the Uncertainty of Proofs and Reports from Spanish Magistrates in Europe and America—1 and a half per Cent. for Solicitors and Lawyers Fees, &c. 1 per Cent. more, making it all 6 per Cent.

And here I cannot sufficiently extol the commendable Lenity of our Ministers, in not balancing the Spanish Losses in 1718, with the Expence of defending Gibraltar; because, in that Case, there must have been a considerable Balance on our Side; and the Business of our Ministers we know has all along been to hold the Balance of Europe as steady and even as they could, that it might not lean too much on any one Side.

Sixthly, I have always reckoned Prudence and Foresight the most useful Talents of a Minister, to which must be imputed any Connivance at the Reparation of the Port and Harbour of Dunkirk, by which we may be in a Condition to bridle the Ostend Trade, in Case of a Rupture with his Imperial Majesty.

Now let us consider what our Adversaries can alledge as a Draw-back upon all the before-mentioned Advantages. Have we not got very near as good a Peace as we should have had in the Year

1725? Have we not the *same Declaration* with Regard to the Advantages in Trade, pretended by our Ministers to have been granted to the Emperor? viz. That they mistook the Article, and did not understand the King of Spain's Meaning?

All the Difference between our Circumstances, now and then, is no more than that the Emperor is not included, which may perhaps Occasion a little *Brush* with him on that Account, which I dare say will not last above a Campaign or two. But to stop the Mouths of these eternal Cavillers, I desire they will give a plain Answer to this Dilemma; either the Emperor is a Match for the Powers, who, in that Case, will oppose him; or he is not. If he is, then he is a formidable Power, and ought to be reduced. If He is not, then he must quickly succumb.

Our Adversaries alledge that we have had a great Interruption of Trade, and that our Merchants have suffered many Losses. To this I answer, the first will be settled on as good a Foot as it was before, and like a Stream damm'd up, will run with greater Force in the old Channel. As to our Losses, they will be fully repaired. Vide Observations, Pag. 15. As to the extraordinary Taxes, they have been most of them spent at Home, amongst our own People; for tho' we have been at a considerable Expence in exporting a great Quantity of our Specie, for the support of the Hessian and Wolfenbottle Troops; yet we have managed extremely prudent with respect to our Navy; for by keeping them all the Summer at Spithead, we have had the Money spent among ourselves; and we have also had an Opportunity of giving a Proof of the Valour of our Troops by the Defence of Gibraltar. But the greatest Advantage of all is the separating Spain

from the Emperor, and joining her again to France, by which the Balance of Europe is restored again as it ought to be. As for my Part, I cannot help thinking that what gives the most sensible Relish to the whole Negotiation, is to see the Cordiality of the French Nation, our ancient Foes, in contributing to this Scene of Felicity. As to what they say about Don Carlos, I think the Affair is extremely plain. Either the Emperor had an Intention to marry him to the Arch-Duchess, or he had not. If he had not, why a Plague did he make all that Buffle? If he had, it is better that it should be done by our Consent and Intermision, than otherwise.

Upon the whole Matter, Things being brought to this happy Period, who is there that can be dissatisfied at the Measures which have brought it about? Who is there that can grumble at any of the Votes of Credit; since we now reap the happy Fruits of them? Who is there that can repine, if our Circumstances at Home should be a little worse than they were; since they are so much mended Abroad?

May the Nation rejoice, as it were with one Voice! May our Right Worshipful Mayor and worthy Aldermen meet at Guildhall in their Fur-Gowns to Pen a warm and dutiful Address on this Occasion! May a Day of general Thanksgiving be appointed, and may Lords and Commons, who have not had any Occasion of going thither this long Time, now go in solemn Procession to the Metropolitan Church! And since we are all like to be Sharers in this Blessing, let us join in acknowledging Merit, where it is so justly due, heartily wishing that these Peace-Makers may not fail to meet with their proper Reward.

F I N I S.

A SHORT VIEW of the State of Affairs, with relation to Great Britain, for Four Years past: With some Remarks on the Treaty lately publish'd, and a Pamphlet entitled, *Observations upon it.*

A PAMPHLET having been lately published by Mr. Buckley, entitled, *A Treaty of Peace, Union, Friendship, and Mutual Defence, between the Crowns of Great Britain, France and Spain, &c.* it cannot be improper nor unseasonable to take a short View of the State of Affairs, with relation to Great Britain, for some Years past, and the Prospect which this Treaty gives us for the time to come.

In the Year 1724, his late Majesty was pleased to assure us from the Throne, that We had Peace with ALL POWERS Abroad; and we were, in particular, so far from having any Contests or Disputes with the Emperor and the King of Spain, as to all outward Appearance at that Time, that we were made Mediators between them at the Congress of Cambray, in Conjunction with France; but immediately after this, the Face of Affairs was intirely changed, by the Conclusion of the Treaty of Vienna; which gave our Ministers such dreadful Apprehensions of some secret Designs against the Interest of Great Britain, that it induced them to project a Counter-Alliance, called the Hanover Treaty, to oppose the Machinations of these new Allies, and prevent the Execution of their Schemes.

The secret Motives to this sudden, unaccountable, and formidable Union (as it was stiled in the Enquiry) between the Courts of Vienna and Madrid, was canvassed very largely last Winter, by the Gentlemen concerned in the *Craftsman* and his Opponents; and I think it was demonstratively proved by the former, that the sending back the Infanta was the immediate Cause, with relation to France, which threw the King of Spain into the Arms of the Emperor; and that our Refusal to accept of the sole Mediation, upon this Occurrence, out of Complaisance to our good Allies the French, was one accessory Cause of it; as another might be our Refusal to deliver up the Fortress of Gibraltar into the Hands of the Spaniards, in pursuance of a positive Engagement, as they pretended, and a Promise, founded on a LETTER from his late Majesty to the King of Spain; which hath been since fully explained to the World.

The Emperor might likewise have some private Reasons for accepting this Offer from Spain, besides those advantageous Terms, which were proposed to him, and have been so much exaggerated.

But whatever might be the secret Springs of this Alliance, the open and profess'd Motives to the Project of the Treaty of Hanover, were the secret Articles which the Treaty of Vienna was said to contain; and these indeed were the only reasonable and justifiable Motives, which could engage our Ministers in it; for a meer Union between the Emperor and Spain was not, of itself, of so formidable a Nature, as it hath been represented. They might have concluded a Treaty of Peace, or Commerce, or Mutual Defence, as all Nations have a Right to do, without giving any reasonable Ground of Resentment or Apprehension. Nay, We might have safely acceded to such a Treaty, as we were invited to do. But it was the secret, offensive Treaty, which raised our Indignation, alarmed our Fears, and put us upon our Guard. For this Reason, the Author of the Enquiry employ'd all his Strength to prove that there really was such a secret Treaty; and he seem'd to be as positive, as if he had been present at the signing of it, that the following Articles were contain'd in it, viz. I. That the King of Spain had entered into an Engagement to support his Imperial Majesty by Force of Arms, in carrying on a Trade from

Ostend to the East Indies, in Violation of Treaties, as it was alledg'd; and had given him greater Privileges of Trade in the West Indies, than to the English. II. That his Imperial Majesty had taken a like Engagement to assist the King of Spain, in endeavouring to wrest Gibraltar out of our Hands. III. That they had both jointly engaged to make an Attempt in Favour of the Pretender, and to set him upon the Throne of Great Britain. IV. That a Marriage was agreed upon between the Infant Don Carlos and the eldest Caroline Archduchess; which threaten'd Europe with universal Monarchy.

These were the secret Engagements; which gave Occasion to the Treaty of Hanover, and upon which the Expediency of it and the Conduct of our Ministers hath been justified both within Doors and without.

Indeed, this secret, offensive Treaty, and the Articles supposed to be contain'd in it, were immediately and very strenuously denied by the contracting Parties in the Treaty of Vienna; particularly That of endeavouring to set the Pretender on the British Throne; which the Emperor ordered his Minister to declare, upon his Imperial Word, to be entirely without Foundation: But the Emperor is a Papist, as the Author of the Enquiry very justly observed; and therefore his Word could not be of equal Validity with the learned Arguments of a good, Protestant Writer, or the solemn Asseveration of a Protestant Minister. I speak this with all due Deference to our French Allies; who, tho' Papists in Principle, have been found thoroughly Protestants in their Practices.

It must be confessed likewise, that whatever might be the Engagements of this secret, Offensive Treaty, (which was never yet brought to Light) there does not seem to be the least Proof (I mean, besides the Arguments and Asseverations before-mentioned) that the Emperor gave his Catholic Majesty any Assistance during the Siege of Gibraltar; or that his Catholic Majesty, on the other Hand, supported the Emperor in his Project for carrying on a Trade from Ostend; or gave him any Privileges of Commerce in the West Indies, superior to what had been granted to the English; or that there ever was any Design of a Marriage between Don Carlos and the eldest Archduchess of Austria. But these are Postulata which we are oblig'd, and every good Englishman will be ready to grant for the Justification of those wise and steady Measures which our Ministers have so gloriously pursued for several Years past.

Great Pains have been taken on both Sides to throw the Occasion of our late unhappy Disturbances upon each other. The clandestine Manner, in which the Defensive Treaty of Vienna was carried on, without communicating it to the Court of Great Britain, was made a principal Argument in the Enquiry, that there must be a secret Offensive Treaty. On the other Hand, the Imperialists have endeavoured to throw the Odium back upon us; and alledg'd, in their Excuse for this private Way of Treating, that We gave the first Umbrage, and set them an Example for it, by concluding a private Treaty at Madrid, whilst We were under the Circumstances of Mediators between that Court and Vienna. But This also is a very nice and curious Question, which I shall not take upon me to determine.

Without enquiring therefore any farther into the Grounds and Reasons of these two great Alliances, let us consider what have been the Consequences of them; and here, I think, there can be no Room for Dispute; since whatever might be

be the *Motives* to the Treaty of Vienna, or the *secret Designs* of it, the Conclusion of a Treaty with France, in Opposition to it, was certainly the Occasion of widening our Differences with Spain, and engaged us in those *Measures* (both *Hostile* and *Pacific*) which have been since taken.

Three large Squadrons of Ships of War were immediately equipp'd at a vast Expence, and sent into the *Baltick*, the *Mediterranean*, and the *West Indies*. The Commander of the last had ever-memorable Orders to lye before *Portobello*, and block up the *Galleons* which were then coming Home, and even to use *Persuasive Force*, in order to possess himself not only of them, but likewise of the *Flotilla*, which lay at *La Vera Cruz*, some Thousand Miles off; but the *Spaniards* not being so complaisant as to put themselves in his Power, he continued upon that unwholesome Station, till his Ships were almost destroy'd by the *Worm*, his Provisions spent, and his Men perish'd by Thousands, in the most miserable Manner. Nor was *This* all. The King of Spain look'd upon this Procedure as an Act of *Hostility*, and resented it accordingly, by laying a vigorous Siege to *Gibraltar*; and it hath been made a Doubt whether our *Allies* did not view it in the same Light; for tho' it was stipulated in the Treaty of *Hanover*, that the contracting Parties should assist and support each other, in Case their Dominions were attack'd; tho' We had frequent Assurances given us by a certain Gentleman, that the French would make the Siege of *Gibraltar* a *Casus Foederis*, and were ready to march a large Army into *Roussillon*, to divert that Design, or oblige the *Spaniards* to raise it; yet, I say, nothing of all this was done. The Siege continued several Months; and as the Emperor did not assist the King of Spain, in carrying it on, as the Author of the Enquiry told us he had engaged to do; so neither did the Court of France move a Man to our Assistance in the Defence of it, as one of the Patrons of the Enquiry assured us they would; but they observed an exact *Neutrality* as most, and sat unconcern'd Spectators of our Danger and Expence.

I cannot forbear observing in this Place, that tho' these extraordinary naval Armaments and Expeditions, were look'd upon as *Hostilities* by the *Spaniards*, and produced a Return of *Hostilities* upon Us; yet they did not answer the End which farther *Hostilities* would very probably have done; and at the same Time gave our *Allies* an Opportunity of withholding their Assistance, by opening a Dispute whether we were not the *Aggressors*; for in that Case, they were not obliged to assist us, by virtue of an Alliance, which was *Defensive* only. Thus we had the Misfortune to do enough to provoke the *Spaniards* to *Hostilities*, but not enough to bring them to a Compliance with our Terms.

Our Land Forces were considerably augmented upon the same Account. Our Taxes were of Consequence increased; and our National Debts were so far from being reduced in such a Degree, as they might otherwise have been, that instead of discharging a great Part of them, which we could have done, we have been incurring a large Debt, which we need not have done.

In the mean Time, our Trade decay'd in every Part of it, and dwindled away almost to nothing in some of its most beneficial Branches, our Manufactures declin'd, and our Merchants sustained insupportable Losses; their Ships being taken without Number in the *West Indies*, the *Ocean* and even in our own Channel, having no Convoys to guard them, and no Letters of *Reprisal* granted to make themselves Satisfaction.

At Length, Preliminaries were agreed upon for a general Pacification; which were sign'd at Paris, on the 20th—31st of May, 1727, by the Ministers Plenipotentiary of his Imperial Majesty, his Britannick Majesty, the most Chri-

stian King and the States General; and on the 2d—13th of the next Month they were sign'd at Vienna by the Minister of his Catholick Majesty; that is, above Two Years and an Half ago.

By this Convention it was stipulated, that within the Space of four Months after these Articles were signed, a Congress should be open'd, in which all the Rights and Pretensions of the contracting Powers should be examin'd, discuss'd and determin'd; and that the several Powers should earnestly injoin their respective Plenipotentiaries to avoid all Obstructions or Embarrassments, which might in any Manner protract or disturb the Congress.

But the Preliminaries were no sooner sign'd, than new Difficulties and Disputes were started concerning the Meaning of them; particularly with regard to those Articles, which affected Great Britain; such as the raising the Siege of *Gibraltar*, and releasing the Ship *Prince Frederick*, as well as the other Ships taken by the *Spaniards*. His Catholick Majesty insisted that a meer Suspension of Arms, stipulated by the Preliminaries, did not imply an actual raising of the Siege, and that the Restitution of the Ship, *Prince Frederick*, was not mentioned or included in them; whereas we demanded both, by Virtue of those Articles. The Court of Spain insisted likewise on an Indulto of 20 per Cent upon the Effects of private Persons, embark'd in the *Flotilla*, contrary to the 5th Preliminary Article, as it was alledged on our Part.

After these new Disputes had been agitated, with great Warmth, for several Months, they were adjusted by another Convention, negotiated by the Count de Rottembourg, Minister of France at the Court of Spain, and sign'd at the Pardo on March the 6th, 1728. By this Convention the Preliminaries were new model'd and it was again agreed that all the respective Pretensions on each Side should be produced, debated and decided in the Congress. Upon this the King of Spain agreed to the Ratification of the Preliminaries; but this was no sooner done than still other fresh Difficulties arose, concerning the Orders, which were agreed on both Sides, to be sent to the *West Indies*, in Pursuance of this Act of Ratification; but at length these Difficulties were likewise got over, for the Present, and the Congress was open'd at *Soissons* on the 3d—14th of June 1728, above eight Months after the Time that was stipulated by the Preliminaries.

It is necessary to observe here again that, during all these Negotiations, we had no Minister at the Court of Spain, but depended on the good Offices of M. Vandermeer and the Count de Rottembourg, who managed all our Affairs; and I have been told that one of them did not act his Part intirely to our Satisfaction.

However, this Point of the Congress being at last obtained, after a tedious Course of Negotiation and Solicitation, attended with various Schemes, Projects and Conventions. We had the strongest Assurances given us that our Affairs would be now brought to a speedy and happy Accommodation; that our Trade would be secured, for the future, on a firm and solid Foundation; that our unfortunate, suffering Merchants would receive ample Satisfaction for all their past Losses; and that the Affair of *Gibraltar* and *Portmahon*, which had given us so much Uneasiness, would not be so much as mentioned in the Congress.——But what was the Event? The Plenipotentiaries assembled in Form, and having spent five or six Months in Ceremonies, and Compliments to Cardinal Fleury, as well as Entertainments, Balls, Hunting-Matches and other Diversions, they broke up and returned to their respective Courts, without settling any material Point towards the general Pacification, so long promised and desired.

Indeed

Indeed a Project, call'd the *Provisional Treaty*, was concerted by the *Allies of Hanover*, and laid before the World last Winter, with pompous OBSERVATIONS upon it; in which the great Wisdom of *that Scheme* was explained and Hopes given us that their *Imperial and Catholick Majesties* would accede to it. But as this Project was far from giving a general Satisfaction at Home, so neither was it ever accepted by *Those Powers Abroad*. On the contrary, the main Business of the Parliament was no sooner got over, than Affairs seem'd again to be tending to a Rupture. The Conferences at *Swissons* continued suspended, and military Preparations were renewed in most Parts of Europe; particularly at SPITHEAD, where a powerful, united Fleet of English and Dutch Ships of War assembled together in a very formidable Figure, as if designed for some great Enterprize of the last Importance; but having lain there at Anchor, for the whole Summer, in a very peaceable and hospitable Manner, for the Reception and Entertainment of Visitors (whose Curiosity to view so fine a Sight drew them thither from all Parts of the Kingdom) they separated at last, without committing one Act of Hostility, and returned in Safety to their respective Harbours.

The Continuance of this *pacifick Armada* at Spithead, for so many Months together, hath given some People an Handle to suggest that one of our *Allies* hath received some Assurances of Satisfaction for their extraordinary Expence on this Occasion; and that our military Genius was restrained from any hostile Exploits by the prevailing Influence of the other. They go farther, and alledge that the Dutch Squadron, which join'd ours, was not originally designed for that Service. They tell us, with great Assurance, that they were equipped to prevent the Designs of his Danish Majesty, with Respect to the *Altena Company*; and that *That Affair* being made easy for the present, we prevail'd upon them, by our *persuasive Influence*, to make a Figure with us at Spithead; but that they had no Orders to sail any farther, suppose we had been in a fighting Humour, being neither victualled nor otherwise provided for any Expedition; but I make no Doubt that these Suggestions will be soon proved groundless, in a proper Place, and that the Equipment and Disposition of this Fleet will appear to be wise, prudent and necessary.

It hath been however our peculiar Misfortune that, during all this Time, whilst our Expences and Taxes have run very high, our Commerce hath been grievously interrupted in its most valuable Branches; not only by the continued Depredations of the Spaniards on our Merchants in the West Indies, but likewise by a very strict Embargo, which it was thought expedient to lay, for above two Months together, on all Ships bound from *Jamaica* and *Virginia*, on some Apprehensions, as it is said, of a Descent from the Spaniards. I call this a peculiar Misfortune to us, because our Allies have not lain under the same Disadvantages in their Trade and the Consumption of their Manufactures; but, on the contrary, have reap'd a very great Benefit from our Misfortunes; especially the French; who brought their Sugars, Tobacco, and other American Commodities to a much better Market in Europe, by the Restraint which was continued so long on our Shipping in those Parts.

But it will be asked, perhaps, why I dwell so long on this melancholy Side of our Case; and do not rather congratulate my Countrymen on that happy Turn, which the Treaty, lately concluded, hath given to our Affairs? My Answer to this is, that I thought it necessary to take a short Review of our Affairs for some Years back; to consider How these Troubles were brought upon us; what we have suffered by them; and what kind of Treatment we have already

met with; in order to form a right Judgment on our present Condition and our future Prospects.

I might also make a Doubt whether the Treaty (lately published by Mr. Buckley) is the genuine Treaty concluded at Seville, because it does not appear to be published by Authority; at least, whether all the Articles are contained in it; which, I confess, seems very improbable, for several Reasons, which I may hereafter mention.

However, I will just take a short View of it (as it is given us) and see whether it contains all those good Things which have been so often promis'd, and we have so much Reason to expect after all our heavy Losses and extraordinary Expences.

Such an Examination is the more necessary at present, because the Publication of this Treaty was immediately follow'd, according to annual Custom, with ridiculous Observations upon it, calculated to impose upon the World, by straining it to a Sense, which the Words will not bear, and could not possibly be intended by the contracting Parties.

But before I examine these Observations, I must beg Leave to make some Remarks on the Introduction to them.

This Method of *wiredrawing* and *refining Treaties*, in Opposition to their natural Construction and the true Design of them, hath been too much practis'd of late, for certain Purposes, which are no Secrets to the World; and I confess that it hath always given me a strong Suspicion of Inability or bad Designs, when there is any Occasion for Explications and Refinements of this Nature; for as plain Terms are always more ready than ambiguous and equivocal ones, they will always be prefer'd by Men of Understanding and Integrity, who will never suffer themselves to be impos'd upon, nor endeavour to impose upon their Country by Words which are liable to eternal Cavils and Disputes.

These anniversary Writers have often put me in Mind of the French Mountebank, mention'd by Mr. Addison, who had always a little Boy running before him through the Streets of Paris, and crying, *my Father cures all Sorts of Distempers*; to which the Doctor replied with a grave Voice, *The Child speaks Truth*——Charlatans in Politics must have their *Zanies* and *Merry-Andrews* as well as other Quacks; but as a certain great Doctor hath sent his Children before him, without any Success, for some Years past, he hath thought fit, at last, to speak for himself, and be the Trumpeter of his own Fame.

If these Political Commentators could persuade foreign Princes to understand Treaties in the Sense which they are pleas'd to put upon them, it would be a real Service to their Country, but the Case is quite otherwise, and their Explanations have been hitherto constantly disowned by the Powers Abroad, as soon as they had served their Purposes, for which they were intended at Home; and this hath often had a double ill Effect; for as it gives us the Character of awkward Tricksters in foreign Courts, so it always makes us uneasy and diffident at Home, when we find ourselves disappointed and deluded into false Expectations.

This is too evident from what hath been observed upon the Treaties and Conventions before-mention'd; and I wish it may not be verified in the present Treaty and the Comment now before us, upon which I shall take the Liberty of making some Remarks, without being in the least affected with the Scurrility of the Author, who seems to have the Vanity to think that his insolent Reflections and dogmatical Assertions will preclude all farther Examination, and deter others from contradicting what he lays down, he might as well have said, Pray, Gentlemen, read over these Articles and confess what a glorious Peace I have procured for you. It is sufficient, Gentlemen, that I say it; and if

if you offer to be of another Opinion, it is a plain Sign that you are no better than Jacobites and Papists in your Hearts.

It seems very extraordinary that this Gentleman should think proper to justify this Treaty, before any Objections had been published against it; for tho' he is pleas'd to say that some People have taken Pains to discredit it, even before they had seen it; I confess I am at a Loss to guess whom he means. I am sure, those Writers, with whom he seems to be so very angry, have purposely declined any Animadversions upon it, tho' they might perhaps have been apprized of some of the Articles, till it was published by Authority; and I hope a Man of his Importance would not condescend to turn Pamphleteer, and waste so much of his precious Time in answering the private Whispers of Coffee-House Politicians.

His great Officiousness therefore in having the first Word and answering Objections, before they are made, looks as if he was conscious to himself that the Peace was not sound at the Bottom, and stood in need of some Explanation to support it. But how hath he attempted to vindicate it? Why, by celebrating his own excellent Conduct and abusing some particular Gentlemen, whom he is pleas'd not to like, in so licentious a Manner, that nothing can add to his Vanity and Insolence, but endeavouring, by his Interest in any Place, or in any Manner, to prohibit the same Freedom of writing on the other Side.

I hope that he will have so much Modesty, at least, as not to make any such Attempt after this; and I think it a very seasonable Opportunity to put the World in Mind of the great Usefulness of the Liberty of the Press; for if any Restraint should be laid upon it, by his Means (and I believe no other Man will ever attempt it) they cannot expect any Accounts of political Affairs, of any Kind whatsoever, besides such partial and scandalous Glosses as that, which is now before us.

The Observer seems very unhappy, at his first setting out, in the Description he gives of those Men, who, as he supposes, will find Fault with this Treaty. He tells us they are like those Wretches that live upon dangerous Coasts, whose Profit arises from Wrecks; who subsist by the Misfortunes and Calamities of his Fellow Creatures; and whose Affliction is consequently an happy Presage of Calm and Serenity. I say, this Description does not seem to suit Those to whom he applies it, so well as it does a great, overgrown, wicked Minister, who hath enrich'd himself by the Spoils of a Nation; whose Power subsists by the Misfortunes and Calamities of his Fellow Subjects; and whose Downfall would consequently be an happy Omen of the Prosperity of his Country.

He insinuates, afterwards, that the Arguments of these wicked Men, his Opposers, have made no small Impression at the Court of Madrid. How strange and, at the same Time, how melancholly a Consideration is it, that such a mean, inconsiderable and despicable Faction, as they have been often represented, should have any Influence in foreign Courts, or be able to give the least Obstruction to him and his Associates in their wise and notable Negotiations?

He is likewise full of his Apprehensions that the Suggestions of this same mean and inconsiderable Cabal will have some Influence on the Counsels of Vienna, and says, We may most certainly expect that they will now apply their whole Skill and Invention to find out such Reasons as may best serve to divert his Imperial Majesty from becoming a Party to these Engagements.

Now, in my humble Opinion, this Work is already done to their Hands by the Observer Himself, who hath furnish'd his Imperial Majesty, in this very Pamphlet, with ample Reasons for not acceding to the Treaty, as I shall presently

shew; and, in the mean Time, I will leave the Reader to judge whether charging so great a Prince with Ingratitude and Breach of Faith (as this Writer does by a very strong Implication) is the most probable Method of making him our Friend.

He cannot forget surely how such Usage, from Him and his Creatures, upon all Occasions, was resented at Vienna some Years ago. Nay, he seem'd to be sensible of it last Winter, and began to soften his Language towards that Court, and bestow'd the same kind of Rhetorick on their Catholick Majesties; but now, it seems, Things have taken another Turn, by his wise and steady Measures, and the Emperor must submit to be abused, in the same Manner, again.

But to return—The Reasons of his Apprehensions that this little, powerful Cabal of his Adversaries, will use all their Interest at the Court of Vienna, to divert his Imperial Majesty from acceding to the Treaty, are contained in the following Words. It cannot certainly be expected, that the same Persons who were so much alarmed at the Negotiations, and apprehended so many ill Consequences to themselves, from the Conclusion of a Provisional Treaty, should shew less Concern and Disappointment upon the News of a solid and lasting Peace; or should be less alert and active in their Endeavours to prevent its becoming general.

This is equally candid with that Character which He gives of those Persons in the preceding Pages, and equally probable with the rest of his Consequences. How solid and lasting this Peace is like to be, We may judge from his own Observations on the chief Articles of it; but I must first take Notice, that those Persons, who cannot possibly reap any Advantage from the highest Taxes, must be very fond of parting with their Money, if they are less desirous of seeing them diminish'd by a solid and lasting Peace, than some other Persons, who may heap up farther Riches by them.

I am well apprized, from past Experience, that even exposing the vile Sophistry of this Pamphlet, may be called furnishing the EMPEROR with Arguments against acceding to the Treaty, and endeavouring to prevent its becoming general. To this I shall only reply once for all, that it is a Topic which may be equally urged at any Time, against any bad Measures or wicked Ministers whatsoever; and therefore I am sure that the sensible Part of the World (who do not hold an Implicit Faith in Ministers) will lay no manner of Stress upon it, let it be repeated and echoed back upon us never so often or strongly by this Gentleman and his Associates.

Having made our Way thus far through the Billinggate Rubbish of his Introduction, We come to the Substance and Marrow of his Book; and here, perhaps, it will be said, that He does not fight against the Air; since He begins his Observations with taking Notice of some false Insinuations, which these same wicked Persons have already let fall, with regard to this Treaty, which they could not, says He, at that Time have possibly seen, and of the Contents of which they would persuade us, that the Directors of a Company, extremely interested in the Consequences of this Treaty, were equally ignorant; though those Directors had seen and approv'd them.

Can any Thing be more ridiculous than this Paragraph, which carries along with it a full Answer to the Charge it contains? For who could possibly apprehend, that these Directors had seen the Contents of the Treaty at that Time; or were not equally ignorant of them with all other Englishmen, who are equally interested, at least, in the Consequences of it? Who could imagine (till this worthy Gentleman was pleas'd to inform us of it) that the Managers of a monied Corporation should be more favoured than all the rest of his Majesty's Landed and Trading Subjects; or even than the whole Body of the Proprietors of the Company it self, in whose Name They expressed their Approbation of it?

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We all know in what Manner such Things are often carried; and if it should appear that this *Obsequiousness* to *Ministerial Purposes* was drawn from them, by the indirect Methods of any of their *Managers*, without having the same Knowledge communicated to them, We hope They will shew their *Repentment* of it at the ensuing Election of *Directors*, and not suffer themselves to be led by any Men, who make a Property of them upon every Occasion.

It hath likewise been hinted, quoth the *Observer*, that the securing of the Succession of Don Carlos in Italy, by Spanish Garrisons (which makes one of the principal Stipulations of the new Treaty) is a Step that may prove dangerous to the Peace of Europe; and that the Emperor, in particular, is obliged in Interest to prevent its taking Effect.

In the first Place, I appeal to the World, who were the first that not only hinted, but expatiated very largely on the Danger which Europe had reason to apprehend from the Prospect and growing Grandeur of Don Carlos? Did not the *Author of the Enquiry* begin it three Years ago; and was it not very strenuously insisted upon last Winter, by this very *Writer himself*, and his *Advocates*, that this Succession, upon any Terms, was absolutely contrary to the Interest of all Europe, and particularly to that of Great Britain? But since he hath now thought fit to alter his Note, for wise and steady Reasons; so far as even to affirm, that instead of being contrary to the Interest of all Europe, there can be no solid Objection made to it; and since the Succession of Don Carlos in Italy is made one of the principal Stipulations in the new Treaty (as He, for once very justly observes) I will give this Affair a particular Examination.

I shall not say any Thing in this Place, concerning the Equity of disposing of Dominions, to which we cannot pretend any sort of Right; because it may seem ridiculous to turn *Moralist*, and discuss a Point of *Casualty*, where *Politics* are concerned.

Besides, the *Observer* hath told us, that whatever Objection might be made to this Succession, it is already consented to, and established by the *Quadruple Alliance*; though if it should be allowed to be bad it self, I do not see how this will mend it, or that one false Step is any Justification of another; especially if it could be avoided; and I shall leave it to this *nice Distinguiser*, to shew any Reason why he could not depart from one Point of the *Quadruple Alliance* as well as another; or whether indeed the whole of it is not vacated by this *Contravention*; especially as far as it relates to Don Carlos, and the Emperor.

However, I will consider this Affair in a political View only, and as it relates to the *Quadruple Alliance*; by which it was stipulated, that the Duchies of Tuscany, Parma and Placentia, in Case the present Dukes should die without Issue Male, should descend to the eldest Son of her Catholic Majesty and his Heirs Male. It was likewise stipulated by that Treaty, That these Dominions should never be in the Possession of any Prince, who shall at the same time be King of Spain; that no King of Spain shall ever take upon Himself the Guardianship of such Prince; and farther, that during the Lives of the present Possessors of those Dominions, neither the Emperor, the King of France, the King of Spain, or the Prince, before nominated to that Succession, shall be permitted to introduce any Troops of their own Nation, or of any other Nation in their Pay, into those Dominions, nor to put any Garrisons into any of the Towns, Ports, Cittadels or Fortresses belonging to them; but that for securing this eventual Succession, upon the Demise of the present Possessors, the principal Places of those Dominions should be garrison'd with a Body of Swiss Forces, not exceeding six thousand Men, to be paid by Germany, France and Great Britain, in equal Proportions; or that if the Swiss Cantons could not

conveniently raise such a number of Troops soon enough for that Service, His Britannick Majesty was to furnish them with the Consent of the other contracting Parties, till the Swiss Troops could be raised, and take Possession of those Places.

Whereas it is stipulated by the present Treaty, That the introducing of Garrisons into the Places of Leghorn, Porto-ferriario, Parma and Placentia, to the Number of six thousand Men of his CATHOLICK MAJESTY'S TROOPS, and in his PAY, shall be EFFECTUATED WITHOUT LOSS OF TIME.

The *Observer* spends several Pages in justifying this Stipulation in Favour of Don Carlos, and pronounces the Court of Vienna to be very ill advised, and very unjust or unreasonable, if they refuse to accede to the Treaty of Seville, on account of this Variation from the *Quadruple Alliance*, by the Introduction of Spanish, instead of Swiss Garrisons, into the fortified Places of Tuscany and Parma.

Though I am not one of those, whom our great Author hath represented so averse to the general Tranquillity of Europe, as to suggest Arguments which may prevent its taking Effect; yet I must beg Leave to express my own Apprehensions, that his Imperial Majesty may think it somewhat derogatory to his Honour, to permit the Succession to so considerable a Fief of the Empire to be disposed of, not only without his Consent, and in the manner of it, contrary to a solemn Treaty, of which he was a principal Party; but likewise with an Air of Triumph over him, and as an Expedient to dissolve an Alliance which hath been represented so advantageous to him.

His suffering himself to be disunited from so beneficial an Alliance, rather than come into this Project, is likewise an Argument to me, that he thought it contrary to his Interest.

But as this Introduction of Spanish Troops is to be EFFECTUATED without Loss of Time; let us consider how far this Variation from the *Quadruple Alliance* may affect Great Britain, and the general Tranquillity of Europe, proposed to be established by this Treaty.

I think it is allowed by this *Writer* and his *Advocates*, as well as others, that our present Circumstances require a speedy and solid Peace; but I am afraid it will be found, that this Variation is very far from tending to facilitate that good End; for however averse the present Dukes of Tuscany and Parma, and all the Italian Princes, might be to have their Dominions disposed of in this Manner, even after their Death; yet they might, perhaps, think fit quietly to submit to it, upon the Terms of the *Quadruple Alliance*; when they saw all the chief Powers of Europe concurring in a Resolution to that Purpose; but when these Terms are varied from Neutral to Spanish Troops, contrary to the Inclination of one of the contracting Parties, they will certainly endeavour to oppose it; and I confess this Variation does not seem immaterial to Them, for the following Reasons:

First, The present Dukes might think their Persons to be safer, whilst their Towns were garrison'd by Forces, which would not join in any Violence upon them, without the Concurrence of three neutral Kings, who had no Reason to be so impatient for the speedy Accession of Don Carlos, as their Catholic Majesties seem to be.

Secondly, Neutral Garrison, would certainly lie under a less Temptation to meddle, directly or indirectly, in Affairs of the Political, OEconomical and Civil Government.

If therefore, for these, or any other Reasons, the present Possessors should refuse Admittance to the Spanish Troops; and his Imperial Majesty, upon their Application, should think fit to assist them in it, either for just or unjust Reasons; I leave the World to judge, whether this Treaty hath
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procured us that *only good End* of all our late tedious Negotiations, which we have so long desired, and hath been so often promised us; I mean a *general and lasting Peace*; for if we must be involved in a War (as this Writer seems to prognosticate) it matters but little with what Prince it begins; and I must put him in Mind, that though a Peace with Spain may be more advantageous to a Trading Nation than a Peace with the Emperor; yet a War with the Emperor would be, for the same Reason, more burthensome and impracticable, to a Maritime Power, than a War with Spain.

I have heard it often alledged in Conversation, that it is not in the Power of his Imperial Majesty to prevent the Execution of this Treaty; but this Allegation has been sufficiently confuted by the Author of the Enquiry, who told us, that the Emperor alone was capable of disturbing it, as well as by the Assertion of the Writer before us, who says, *That had that Succession been left open, all Italy, considering the Strength and Influence of those Dominions, which the Emperor hath already got Possession of in that Country, must in all Probability have fallen into his Hands; or at least into such Hands as must have had an entire Dependence on him.* In another Place he says, *That the Emperor can be under no Apprehensions of Danger on this Head, having constantly in the Neighbourhood of those Garrisons, a Number of Troops, more than sufficient, to awe and check them, should they offer to exceed the Bounds prescribed them.*

My Inference from this is, That if his Imperial Majesty hath such an Influence in Italy, that he could have possessed himself of these Duchies, in Opposition to all the Italian Princes, in case this Succession had been left open; or is even strong enough to awe and check these Troops, when put in Possession of the fortified Towns; he may certainly give a great Opposition to their Assistance, when joined with the Wealth and Power of the two Dukes, and perhaps of some other Italian Princes; so that it is not now the only Question, *Whether this Variation will make that Engagement more effectual or not?* It is likewise a Question, *Whether such a Violence upon those Princes, as to put them and their Dominions under the Power of Spanish Troops, may not spirit up an Opposition to it?* If neutral Troops were to be put in Garrison, the Engagement would have been equally effectual; more consistent, perhaps, with his Imperial Majesty's Honour; and, without Doubt, less disagreeable to the present Possessors.

The Observer advances another Argument in Defence of this Variation, which he seems to think an undeniable Reason for our consenting to it; and that is, *that it frees us from an Engagement we were before under, of paying one third Part of the Expence, which would have been requisite for maintaining neutral Garrisons in the Duchies of Tuscany and Parma.*

I am glad to see any Appearances, in this Gentleman, of frugal Designs; but I doubt This may prove the Occasion of much more Expence; for if it should happen to be the Case, that neutral Garrisons might have been amicably admitted; and that Spanish Troops will be opposed, we may lie under a Necessity of maintaining above seven times that Number of Men in Germany.

And yet this frugal Scheme worked so strongly upon him, that he says any Minister would have deserved the severest Punishment, who should have advised the King to have deferred, for one Month only, the Accommodation of our Differences with the Court of Spain, for the sake of THIS ALTERATION; tho' it may be the Means of involving us in a War, instead of procuring us a general and lasting Peace; but I can easily see the Reason which might induce a Minister not to defer it, for one Month only; especially towards the conclusion of the Year,

Thus stands the Case of this Variation from the Quadruple Alliance, with Regard to the Emperor and the present Dukes of Tuscany and Parma. Let us now consider how it stands with Relation to Spain.

By this Treaty we have stipulated not only to EFFECTUATE the Introduction of Spanish Troops, but likewise to establish this Succession and guaranty it for ever, against any Opposition, in such Manner, that thereby it may rest secure and exempt from all Events.

If therefore the Emperor, in Conjunction with the Italian Princes, or any other Powers, should think fit to oppose it, we cannot avoid entering into a War with Him and his Allies; and if we should happen to fail of Success, by coercive Methods, after perhaps a great Number of expensive Campaigns, the Spaniards might complain of the Non execution of the Treaty, in one of its most important Articles, and vacate the whole, upon plausible Allegations, that however we might have attempted, we had not, according to the Tenor of the Treaty, EFFECTED the Introduction of Don Carlos into Italy.

It is likewise very observable, that there is no Provision in this Treaty, as there was in the Quadruple Alliance, to prevent the Conjunction of these Dominions, upon any Contingency, with the Crown of Spain.

And here, I think, I have much better Grounds than the Author of the Enquiry had, to assert that there must be some secret Treaty, besides That which is made public; for though it is stipulated, that the Introduction of Spanish Troops into Italy, for securing the Succession of Don Carlos, shall be effectuated without loss of Time; yet no Provision is made in what Manner, and at whose Expence, they are to be carried thither.

This is one Reason, amongst many others, which induces me to believe, there are some secret Articles not yet produced; especially since we have lately heard Distinctions made by this Gentleman himself, between a publick OBTAINABLE Treaty (as He phrased it) and a private Treaty kept in reserve. This puts me in mind of the exoteric and esoteric Doctrines of the antient Philosophers; the former of which they propagated amongst the Vulgar, and kept the latter for learned Men only, and private Conversation amongst themselves. I am apt to believe, that our modern Statesmen have built upon this Foundation, and borrowed their Method of Negotiating from the Principles of these Philosophers; since upon examining most of our late Treaties, we shall find very few, which are not restrained by some private or esoteric Articles.

Since therefore such liberal Concessions have been made to Spain, let us next enquire what Advantages are granted in Return to Great Britain, with Regard to our Trade and Possessions, which have been under Dispute.

Our Author tells us, That all former Treaties and Conventions being confirmed by the first Article, we have a very full Acknowledgment, on the Part of Spain, of our Rights to Gibraltar and the Island of Minorca; but as the Pretensions of the Spaniards to the former have been founded on the Convention at Madrid in the Year 1721, some People may be apprehensive that they will renew that Claim, upon a proper Occasion, since this Convention is confirmed, as well as any other, by that Article.

We must therefore, in such a Case, rely upon the second Article, wherein the King of Spain guarantees all his Majesty's Kingdoms, States and Dominions, beyond all possibility of Doubt or Cavil; but I think I may safely accept of his Promise, to shew in what manner they could be more effectually secured; which they most undoubtedly would have been, either by a specifick Remuneration of all Right and Pretensions to them for the future; or, by using his own Terms, foreign

foreign Acquisitions or Possessions. I mention the Term *Possessions*, because our Ministers seemed to be sensible of the *Comprehensiveness* of it, by inserting it in the *Treaty of Hanover*; and the making use of it in the *Articles of Seville*, would have contained a full Acknowledgement of our Right to those Places; and if the Spaniards had a sincere Intention to confirm *that Right*, they would have suffered it to be expressed in Terms as clear as those in Favour of *Don Carlos*. If they were not sincere, but had some *Reserve*, I am afraid that a different Construction of so important an Article will render the Peace less solid and lasting than the *Observer* promises, and every good Englishman hath Reason to wish.

The other Point, which concerns us, relates to the re-establishment of our just Privileges in Commerce, and the Compensation due to our Merchants for their Sufferings during the Rupture; which are left to be settled by Commissioners of both Nations, who are to assemble at the Court of Spain, and to finish their Enquiries within the Space of *three Years*.

There seems to be some Room for three Objections upon this Head.

First, As to the Place, which some People may think would have been more properly fixed at London, where our Merchants, for whose Relief *this Commission* was principally intended, could, with much less Trouble and Expence, have produced the authentick Proofs and Vouchers for their Losses, and reply to any Objections that may be made to their Demands.

The next is with Respect to the Condition, upon which this Compensation is to be made; and that is, *what the Ships, Merchandize and Effects shall not have been taken or seized upon Account of unlawful Commerce*, without specifying or explaining what shall be deem'd *unlawful Commerce*; which hath ever administred Matter of Dispute between the Spaniards and the English.

The third Objection is to the Length of Time assigned to this Enquiry; which I find some Merchants apprehend may, in a great Measure, invalidate *that Stipulation*; for the Spanish Ministers cannot be ignorant of the Italian Proverb, *Chi guadagua Tempo, guadagua Toutto*: He that gains Time, gains every Thing.

These Commissioners are likewise to discuss and decide his Catholick Majesty's Pretensions to the Restitution of the Ships taken in the Mediterranean, in the Year 1718; an Article which may be so cast up by Spanish Accomptants, as to over-balance the Account of the British Merchants, by several Hundred Thousand Pounds.

The *Observer* tells us, That there was the less Pretence for declining this Discussion, because we were sure it would, upon Examination, appear, that it was the Fault of the Spaniards only, that those Ships were not put into their Possession; from whence he would infer, that they cannot expect any Satisfaction for them; though he tells us himself, that at the same Time those Ships were offer'd to be delivered at Port-Mahon, they were in such a decay'd Condition, that, upon Refusal of the Spaniards to accept of them, they were, by the Order of the Governour, sunk in the main Sea. It is therefore reasonable to presume, that they will expect Reparation for them; or why should they have insisted on a Stipulation to that Purpose?

The *Observer* farther says, that the Spaniards found their Claim to this Restitution upon the Treaty of 1721; the very same Treaty, upon which they likewise found their Pretensions to Gibraltar; the very same Treaty which we concluded privately at Madrid, whilst we were Mediators between that Court and Vienna.

As this Convention therefore of 1721 (which, perhaps, it were to be wished never had been made) is confirmed by the first Article of the present Treaty, I do not see why the Spaniards may not insist upon the Restitution of Gibraltar, by Virtue of this Treaty (if there is any such private Article in it, as they alledge) as well as the Restitution of Ships taken in the Mediterranean; unless it be allow'd, that this Article, with Regard to the Case of Gibraltar, is derogated from, in the second Article, under the Words, *Kingdoms, States and Dominions*, which I hope will occasion no future Dispute.

I had almost forgot to take Notice of one Article, which I confess I was somewhat surprized to find in the Treaty, or at least express'd in that Manner; I mean the third, where it is said, that the MINISTERS of his Britannick and most Christian Majesties, having PRETENDED (as it is in the Original) that the Treaties of Vienna between his Imperial Majesty and the King of Spain, contain'd an Infraction of the Treaties of Commerce, antecedent to the Year 1725; his Catholick Majesty declares, as He had before declared, That he never had any SUCH MEANING. I say, I was somewhat surprized to see an Article express'd in this Manner; because it may be construed into a Reflection on the Understanding or Integrity of some Persons of great Importance; and considering the CORDIALITY with which his Catholick Majesty entered into this Treaty, I cannot doubt that he would have suffered this Article to be worded in other Terms.

Whether the Treaty lately concluded at Seville, be just, honourable and advantageous or not, I must leave the World to judge whether this *Observer* hath proved it to be so; but I am very ready to agree with him in acknowledging his Majesty's Goodness to us, and that the Interest of Great Britain hath the chief Place in his Thoughts.

I know very little of the Disputes between his Majesty and the King of Prussia; but if that Prince hath forcibly taken away any of his Majesty's German Subjects, he hath certainly a just Right to Reprisals; as I think our Merchants had for the Ships unlawfully taken from them by the Spaniards.

Neither do I know of any Britons, who now look upon the King of Prussia as their Hero, and could not formerly prevail upon themselves to treat him with common Decency; but I remember very well, that some Men, who now set him forth as a weak, inconsiderable Prince, represented him about four Years ago, as a very potent and profitable Ally.

I am as much at a Loss as this Author, to see how it can be the Duty of an Englishman to encourage Foreign Powers to invade the King's German Dominions, and to excite the Neighbouring Princes to oppress a People, merely because they acknowledge the same Sovereign that we do. I scorn, as much as he, to represent that Country barren and despicable; though I cannot help thinking the British Dominions much more considerable, both to his Majesty and us, and deserving the first Place in our Thoughts. The former hath certainly the common Claim of all Protestant Nations to our Favour and good Wishes; but how far we are obliged, under the Name of Protection, to engage our selves in a War upon that Account, I must leave to the Decision of the Act of Settlement, and to that Way of thinking upon it (as our Author expresses himself) in which the Parliament shall declare themselves to be.

I cannot conclude, without taking Notice of the Disingenuity of this Writer, in putting Cases, and pressing Arguments of a very high and personal Nature, which cannot be answered without such a free Examination, as may be thought improper and disrespectful. The Words of the late Earl of Halifax, when Minister of State, upon a Subject of this Kind, are very candid and applicable to the present Occa-

Occasion; That it is not just to press an Argument, which puts another Man in Pain when he goes to answer it.

But this hath been the constant mean Artifice of our Author and his Advocates. When we offer to argue with them, Their Cause is always the King's Cause, and their Measures must be the King's Measures; which is sometimes true in one Sense, as they are carried on by his Authority, and in his Name; but I must beg Leave to insist upon it, that Ministers, by the Constitution of this Nation, are answerable for all their Measures, though transacted by the King's Authority; and that they ought to be punished for bad Treaties, though concluded under His Royal Sanction.

I hope I have preserved a proper Decency of Language throughout these Sheets; but if I should be thought to have let fall some Expressions with too much Warmth, they ought to be imputed to that Virulence of Style and Manner,

with which our Author hath thought fit to treat this Subject.

When the Reader considers how very lately the *Treaty* and *Observations* were published, he will conclude, that these Thoughts upon them must be very sudden, and thrown together without any Order or Method. I need not therefore ask his Indulgence for any Inaccuracies of Style, or little Mistakes, as to the Reasonings or Facts, which I may have unwarily fallen into, and shall be ready to acknowledge upon Conviction.

I thought some immediate Antidote necessary to expel the Poison, which it was the Design of this Pamphlet to spread through the Kingdom. This was the Occasion of my writing in so much Haste; and I make no Doubt that the same Subject will be soon treated by a much more able and masterly Hand.

F I N I S.